ANALYSIS / U.S. policy unchanged despite Taiwan omission in defense strategy: Analysts

By Sean Lin, CNA staff reporter

The absence of Taiwan in the Pentagon's recently released 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) has raised concerns about the United States' commitment to the island nation's defense.

Published Jan. 23, the document introduces language on engaging China through fair trade and diplomacy -- an approach absent from the 2018 and 2022 editions -- while urging U.S. allies and partners to shoulder greater responsibility for their own defense.

Media outlets including The Associated Press highlighted the lack of explicit security guarantees for Taiwan, contrasting it with the previous NDS issued under former U.S. President Joe Biden, which stated that the U.S. "will support Taiwan's asymmetric self-defense."

Politico also highlighted the shift in the strategy's language in its analysis, titled "Pentagon no longer views China threat as top priority."

However, analysts interviewed by CNA cautioned against reading the omission as a major policy shift, arguing that China remains central to U.S. strategic thinking and that concerns over a retreat from Taiwan may be overstated.

China still central to U.S. defense planning

Amanda Hsiao (蕭嫣然), China director at the New York-based geopolitical risk consultancy Eurasia Group, said deterring China remains a priority for Washington despite the increased focus on homeland defense and the Western Hemisphere in the NDS.

As U.S. President Donald Trump seeks to secure a trade deal with Beijing during a planned April visit to China, "the Trump administration is refraining from explicitly calling China a threat because it wants to maintain stable relations," Hsiao said.

Nevertheless, Washington continues to view China as a major competitor, particularly in the economic and technological arenas, she added.

Hsiao pointed to Washington's actions -- most notably the record US$11.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan in December 2025 -- as evidence that deterrence remains a priority even as rhetoric softens.

"Trump's approach on Taiwan will be to speak softly but carry a big stick," Hsiao said. "He will continue to strike a tone that is deferential to Chinese interests on Taiwan but U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation will also continue to strengthen."

Eric Heginbotham, a principal researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies, echoed that assessment, saying "China clearly remains a top priority" even though "homeland security and hemispheric defense are the big winners" in the new NDS.

Strategic language vs. substantive policy

Heginbotham noted that certain terms in the strategy -- such as "de-escalation," "deconfliction" and "negotiate" -- could be interpreted as signaling reduced emphasis on military deterrence.

However, references to "erecting a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain" and to "collective defense" in the Asian context suggest a commitment to Taiwan's defense.

These passages, he said, are consistent with long-standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity regarding direct military intervention in the event of Chinese aggression.

Lee Kuan-chen (李冠成), a researcher at Taiwan's government-sponsored Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), said the NDS' focus on homeland security and the Western Hemisphere should be understood as "resource integration" rather than a downgrading of other regions.

"[The U.S.] is simply consolidating its resources, so that it can better compete with China, which remains its main competitor," Lee told CNA.

Lee added that Taiwan's omission may reflect Trump's desire to preserve room for negotiations with Beijing, including potential meetings with Chinese leader Xi Jinping (習近平) later this year, and was likely a deliberate choice to avoid provoking China.

"Trump wants to be seen by the American public as a strong dealmaker ahead of the U.S. midterm elections this year," Lee said.

Reading signals without overreaction

Heginbotham argued that not being mentioned in the NDS is "not necessarily a bad thing," noting that Trump tends to focus rhetorical pressure on countries from which he seeks concessions, rather than on those he wishes to reassure.

Ultimately, he said, "it is unclear how much this National Defense Strategy matters."

"President Trump is notoriously unpredictable and appears not to view himself or the country as constrained much by policy lines, strategic documents, or even agreements and treaties," he said.

That unpredictability, Heginbotham added, could, in some ways, enhance deterrence, forcing Beijing into a "difficult calculation" about the likelihood of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict -- especially given Trump's preference for limited strikes, as seen in Venezuela and Iran, rather than prolonged military campaigns.

Lee, from INDSR, said Taiwan must carefully distinguish between strategic language and concrete actions when interpreting U.S. policy, and avoid equating shifts in geographic emphasis with changes in commitment.

"As great-power competition and security realignment continue, what Taiwan truly needs to strengthen is not merely expectations of external commitments, but its capacity to make rational assessments and respond with steadiness in the face of uncertainty," he said.

Enditem/AW