Taiwan must hold out one month if China invades: U.S. war game

Washington, Nov. 20 (CNA) Taiwan would have to fight off a Chinese blockade and invasion for around a month before the United States could successfully airlift or sealift forces or munitions to support it, according to war games organized by a U.S. congressional committee Wednesday.

The finding was made as part of a defense industrial base simulation carried out by the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank.

At a briefing explaining the exercise, CSIS defense expert Mark Cancian said Taiwan's mountainous terrain and two relatively narrow coastal strips make it "a difficult island to capture."

Aside from its terrain, Taiwan's capital, along with most of its industry and military forces, are located in the north, he said, adding that this presents China with "a tough choice."

China can either invade in the north, "into the teeth of the Taiwanese defenses" but also very close to Taipei, or in the south, where it is much easier to get ashore, but "you have to fight your way up the entire island," he said.

In the event of an attack on the south, he said, China would try to get its forces ashore and quickly capture a port or airfield, while the U.S. and Japan would race to sink Chinese amphibious ships so they could no longer support their forces in Taiwan.

"In most of the [simulations] we won that race, but at a very high cost," Cancian said.

If Chinese forces did gain a foothold in the south, the resulting campaign would look like Italy in the Second World War, with Chinese and Taiwanese troops fighting "river line by river line, ridge line by ridge line," he said.

Alternately, in simulations of an attack on the north, where most of Taiwan's defenses are, "it ends up being a huge battle outside of Taipei" Cancian said, adding that it would be "tough" for China to capture the city.

Cancian said one lesson of the war game was the value of anti-ship missiles.

In the next couple of years, "I think the most effective thing you could do is to give Taiwan 500 Harpoon missiles," he said.

Such missiles would be stationed in Taiwan, put on mobile launchers, and able to hit Chinese ships within range, without having to put U.S. troops on the ground, he said.

"The other lesson is that once the fighting begins, it's impossible to get any forces or reinforcements onto Taiwan," Cancian said.

Because Chinese forces would surround Taiwan, the U.S. would not be able to get an airlift or sealift to the island "at least for the first three or four weeks," he said.

For that reason, "Taiwan would have to fight at least the first month, and maybe the first two months, with whatever it starts out with."

Harpoon missiles

In addition to CSIS experts, the war simulation was also attended by House Select Committee on the CCP Chairman John Moolenaar, Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi, and Armed Services Committee Vice Chairman Rob Wittman.

In April, Wittman was one of four U.S. representatives who sent a letter urging the House Appropriations Committee to allocate US$165 million to expedite the delivery of Harpoon missiles to Taiwan.

The lawmakers said the missiles should be delivered within the "Davidson window," a term referring to the 2021-2027 period when former U.S. Indo-Pacific Command head Admiral Phil Davidson believed a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be most likely.

Last year, Bloomberg reported that Taiwan had purchased 400 land-launched Harpoon missiles from the U.S., completing a deal that the U.S. Congress approved in 2020.

Taiwan's Chinese-language Liberty Times reported in September that Taiwan had taken delivery of an unspecified number of Harpoon missiles, part of a total of 128 missiles and 32 launchers that will be delivered by the end of 2026.

In Wednesday's exercise, however, Wittman argued that there is "no way" the U.S. can catch up with China's industrial capacity by 2027. He noted that China has a shipbuilding capacity 232 times greater than the United States, as well as advantages in producing regular and long-range munitions, he said.

The U.S. should therefore not view "exquisite" weapons platforms -- costly, advanced weapons produced in small numbers -- as the solution, and should instead focus on contingency strategies that can be more effective in the near term, he said.